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INTRODUCTION 
Since the economic cataclysm of the Great Depression, the rehabi-
litative principle underlying Chapter 11 business reorganizations has 
focused on the efficiency of preserving valuable assets by sustaining a 
business as a going concern rather than liquidation.1  Despite this tradi-
tional model of reorganization, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides distressed companies with two means of selling all or substan-
tially all of their assets:  a debtor in possession may undertake an asset 
sale (1) pursuant to § 363(b)(1) of the Code2 or (2) within a reorgani-
zation plan under § 1123.3  Regardless of which statutory approach is 
 
1 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-598, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 
(“The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production 
in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets 
sold for scrap.”); Chad P. Pugatch et al., The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 45 (2008) (discussing the Chandler Act’s incorporation of 
Chapter XI in 1938 for the purpose of providing private businesses with a more advan-
tageous course of action than liquidation). 
2 Section 363(b)(1) of the Code permits a trustee “after notice and a hearing” to 
sell assets “other than in the ordinary course of business.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).  
Such sales are often referred to as “out-of-plan sales” because this method bypasses the 
confirmation procedure required of sales within reorganization plans.  Rachael M. Jack-
son, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a Post-Enron World:  Trusting the Bankrupt-
cy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451, 455, 461. 
3 Pursuant to § 1123(a)(5)(D), a company may implement a reorganization plan 
through the “sale of all or any part of the property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(a)(5)(D).  Significantly, because § 1123 asset sales must be completed within the 
bounds of a reorganization plan, these sales are subject to Chapter 11’s comprehensive 
procedural requirements, which serve to balance the interests of the debtor as well as the 
creditors.  See Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B):  The Oppor-
tunity for Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 256-
57 (2006) (demonstrating how Chapter 11 requirements—including a “disclosure state-
ment,” “creditor approval,” and “good faith”—balance the competing objectives of credi-
tor protection with maximization of the estate’s value). 
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pursued, maximization of asset value remains the ultimate goal.4 
From an efficiency standpoint, there are several reasons why § 363 
sales have become more advantageous vehicles than § 1123 reorgani-
zation plans for financially distressed companies.  After the requisite 
notice and hearing,5 these out-of-plan sales provide a more stream-
lined process because purchase agreements face only court approval, 
rather than the more time-consuming confirmation by several classes 
of creditors.6  Thus, corporations in need of fast cash undoubtedly 
prefer the more expeditious § 363 sale.  In addition to the ease of by-
passing the rather burdensome creditor voting rights, § 363 sales are 
more appealing because assets are typically sold free of liabilities,7 and 
legally these transactions are final unless marred by bad faith.8 
Debtors may find § 363 sales increasingly beneficial in the midst of 
recessions as a prompt means of generating “the capital needed to 
fund the company’s reorganization and future survival.”9  As a result 
of the current financial crisis, Chapter 11 filings have inundated bank-
ruptcy courts.10  Insolvent corporations operating in various industries, 
 
4 See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 420 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[A] 
§ 363 sale can often yield the highest price for the assets because of the buyer’s ability 
to select liabilities . . . and to purchase a going-concern business.”). 
5 Notification must be provided to creditors at least twenty-one days prior to the 
hearing.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2).  Cf. Rose, supra note 3, at 259-60 (noting that 
notification pursuant to § 363 sales is less informative due to the lack of “Chapter 11’s 
plan summary and disclosure”). 
6 See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (recognizing the beneficial speed of the 
process under § 363, under which sales are typically completed within two to three 
months (quoting Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., June 2005, at 22)); Jackson, supra note 2, at 461-62 (discussing the time effi-
ciency of avoiding creditor confirmation of a reorganization plan, a process that may 
span several years); Micheline Maynard, Automakers’ Swift Cases in Bankruptcy Shock Ex-
perts, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at B1 (describing the expeditious forty-five day process of 
the General Motors and Chrysler asset sales). 
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (stating circumstances when property may be sold “free 
and clear” of any interest in the property); In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (“‘The 
assets are cleansed in that they are sold, with certain limited exceptions, free and clear 
of liens, claims and liabilities.’” (quoting Steinberg, supra note 6, at 22)). 
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (mandating that the “reversal or modification on appeal” 
of a sale does not affect its validity if it was carried out in good faith). 
9 See Pugatch et al., supra note 1, at 41, 55 (explaining how the economy plays an 
integral role in compelling corporations to seek speedy liquidations in the face of  
financing shortages and overall declines in value). 
10 According to the American Bankruptcy Institute, declarations of bankruptcy by 
businesses nationwide spiked from 28,322 in 2007 to 43,456 in 2008 and 60,837 in 2009.  
Quarterly Business Bankruptcy Filings for 1994–2010, AM. BANKR. INST.,  
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Business_Bankruptcy_Filings1& 
Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=59&ContentID=36301  
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most notably the automobile industry,11 have used § 363 sales as the 
“preferred method of monetizing . . . assets.”12  The recent use of 
§ 363 sales as a substitute for the more traditional Chapter 11 restruc-
turing of large global companies like General Motors, Chrysler, and 
Lehman Brothers13 reflects a dramatic shift in the bankruptcy arena.  
This trend has crystallized the idea that traditional restructurings 
through reorganization plans may have become a method of the past.  
Today, the scope of § 363 has even grown to include the sale of whole 
companies.14  The benefits of this tactic, however, do not come with-
out significant costs. 
Although this strategy is arguably more efficient than participating 
in an in-plan liquidation, § 363 sales have increasingly become more 
controversial and vulnerable to abuse.  Under the current system, 
speed and ease beget inconsistency and a lack of transparency that 
jeopardize the soundness of these deals as well as the interests of cred-
itors.15  Debtor companies pursuing the sale of assets under § 363(b) 
 
(follow “Quarterly Business Bankruptcy Filings for 1994–2010” hyperlink) (last visted 
Jan. 15, 2011).  See also Eric Morath, Business Bankruptcy Filings Increased 7% in October, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2009, at B4 (“On a year-to-year basis, business bankruptcies shot up 
24% in October [2009] compared with the same month in 2008.  Mr. Williams called 
that increase ‘substantial’ and said it is a bad omen for the final months of 2009 and 
the first quarter of 2010.”). 
11 See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the 
sale of substantially all of “Old Chrysler’s” assets to “New Chrysler” as “[c]onsistent with 
an underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code—maximizing the value of the bank-
rupt estate”), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (approving the sale of substantially all of GM’s assets to a “New GM” using § 363 
to “preserve the going concern value; avoid systemic failure; provide continuing em-
ployment; . . . and restore consumer confidence”). 
12 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (quoting Steinberg, supra note 6, at 22); see 
also In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 115 (“In the current economic crisis of 2008–09, § 363(b) 
sales have become even more useful and customary.”). 
13 The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy provides a significant example of how § 363 
sales are a common strategy to rescue firms considered to be “too big to fail.”  Follow-
ing the 2008 financial collapse of Lehman Brothers, and almost immediately after 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, its European investment banking and capital markets 
operations were sold to Barclays Capital, Inc.  See Bay Harbour Mgmt. L.C. v. Lehman 
Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (affirming the sale made under § 363). 
14 See Rose, supra note 3, at 259 (describing the growing concern that use of § 363 to 
liquidate an entire company as an asset was not an action contemplated by Congress); 
Maynard, supra note 6 (emphasizing how the GM and Chrysler asset sales “raised the pro-
file of a tactic once used primarily to shed failing plants or unneeded equipment, and 
was not considered until a few years ago as a substitute for a complete restructuring”).  
15 See Rose, supra note 3, at 250 (“The lack of transparency, the pace of the 
process, and the inconsistent treatment by the courts, however, leave the bankruptcy 
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obtain the advantage of circumventing the disclosure and equity re-
quirements necessary for the approval of a reorganization plan.16  Sig-
nificant differences in the mechanics of these sales—the lack of a dis-
closure statement describing the terms and conditions of the plan,17 
the limited time and information provided to creditors to review the 
proposed sale,18 and an absence of the requirement that the plan be 
in the best interest of each creditor19—create increasing opportunities 
for unfair dealing under § 363.20  Thus, prospective purchasers’ weak 
control over the terms of the transaction,21 as well as creditors’ lack of 
information and input, threatens creditor constituencies, endanger-
ing one of the fundamental aspects of bankruptcy law.22 
 
courts and parties in interest vulnerable to unfair dealing, abuse, and sweetheart 
deals.” (footnotes omitted)). 
16 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 459-65 (comparing the formal requirements of 
Chapter 11 plans with asset sales structured outside of such plans). 
17 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006) (“An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not 
be solicited after the commencement of the case under this title . . . unless, at the time 
of or before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such holder the plan or a sum-
mary of the plan, and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hear-
ing, by the court as containing adequate information.”).  In comparison, the absence 
of this disclosure requirement is substituted with an obligatory notice and hearing un-
der § 363, which are minimal at best.  But see Rose, supra note 3, at 260-61 (arguing that 
“in traditional areas of increased scrutiny—good faith objections and insider dealing—
notice should minimally include what chapter 11 requires”). 
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (permitting the trustee to sell the property of the es-
tate after notice and a hearing); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) (requiring twenty-one 
days notice to all creditors of a proposed sale of property outside of the ordinary 
course of business).  The decrease in information exchange between the debtor and 
creditors and the limited time to raise an objection to a proposed sale prior to a hear-
ing may have the ultimate effect of stifling creditors’ opportunities to prevent a sale.  
See Rose, supra note 3, at 262 (explaining that “[p]lan confirmation depends on credi-
tor approval but § 363 sale approval depends on the creditors’ failure” to carry the 
burden of proving harm within a relatively short period of time). 
19 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (requiring that each creditor “receive or retain un-
der the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective 
date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or 
retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on such date” as a 
prerequisite to court approval of the sale); Jackson, supra note 2, at 459 (noting the 
“best interest of the creditors” rule for court approval of reorganization plans). 
20 See infra note 72 and accompanying text (noting the disproportionately fre-
quent occurrence of insider dealing with § 363 sales). 
21 See Pugatch et al., supra note 1, at 57 (“Sales that occur via a confirmed plan not 
only allow the buyer to negotiate the terms of the acquisition, but also allow the buyer 
to concurrently assist in shaping the reorganization of the debt structure of the com-
pany that it is about to acquire.”). 
22 See Rose, supra note 3, at 277 (“The diminution in information and time creates 
the potential for unfair dealing with § 363 sales.”).  Instances of insider dealing and 
UZIEL_REVISED_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:28 PM 
1194 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1189  
The prominence of § 363 sales, the amplified speed of the 
process, and the use of this provision as an alternative to reorganiza-
tion in unprecedented ways intensify these concerns over potential 
abuses.  As a result of the shockingly speedy General Motors and 
Chrysler sales, where both companies exited from bankruptcy within 
forty-five days,23 critics are now duly alarmed that such hasty timelines 
will become more common, adversely affecting creditors’ ability to 
negotiate throughout the process.24  Furthermore, experts in the field 
criticize these recent § 363 sales as “sham sales,” setting the precedent 
that a debtor can design “pretend” sales of its key assets to a new entity 
set up by the debtor with the objective of avoiding interference by 
creditors and shareholders.25  Critics argue that such sales are “artifi-
cial” because they do not provide for the proper auction process that 
§ 363 calls for—conferring power to one bidder rather than stimulat-
ing multi-party bargaining among other interested parties and credi-
tors—and that they have the potential to violate the priority rules in-
stalled by the Code.26  Regardless of whether these innovative uses of 
asset sales are a product of government involvement or a reaction to 
the unique circumstances of the financial crisis,27 this precedent has 
 
other potential abuses will be discussed later.  See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying 
text. 
23 See Melissa Maleske, Fire Sale:  The Chrysler and GM Bankruptcies Highlight the  
Dominance and Evolution of 363 Sales, INSIDE COUNSEL, Sept. 2009, at 18, 18 (comparing 
the speedy § 363 sales of GM and Chrysler, which lasted forty and forty-two days respec-
tively, to the Chapter 11 reorganization of K-Mart, which lasted from January 2002 
through May 2003). 
24 See Ashby Jones & Mike Spector, Creditors Cry Foul at Chrysler Precedent, WALL ST. 
J., June 13-14, 2009, at B1 (recognizing that the speed of the Chrysler § 363 sale met 
with objections by creditors who felt that their lack of participation in the process re-
sulted in “an end run around creditors”); Maynard, supra note 6 (predicting that for 
creditors, if debtors follow GM’s and Chrysler’s footsteps, it may “mean less time to 
reach a deal”). 
25 See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Why the Chrysler Deal Would Horrify a New Dealer, J. AM. 
ENTER. INST., May 8, 2009, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/why-
the-chrysler-deal-would-horrify-a-new-dealer (equating the controversial New Deal era 
equity receiverships—artificial sales of a company to a new entity created by a debtor—
to the use of § 363 in the Chrysler bankruptcy).   
26 See id. (describing how the sale of Chrysler to an entity owned by the company’s 
employees and Fiat avoids priority rules, by which secured lenders receive less than 
lower priority employees and have little power to object to the sale). 
27 See Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (noting that use of § 363 sales to the detri-
ment of creditors may be a concern that “likely will dissipate when the financial crisis 
ends”); Skeel, supra note 25 (“The government seems to have concluded—as with the 
bailouts of Bear Stearns and the American International Group . . .—that the end justi-
fies the means in the current crisis.”). 
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now opened the door for smaller, private businesses to use § 363 sales 
to restructure their entire business.28 
No matter the cause, the exploitation of § 363 has jeopardized the 
soundness of these transactions.  That creditors will likely fail to find 
sanctuary in bankruptcy courts’ treatment of § 363 sales augments 
such concerns.  The prevalent standard for court approval of § 363 as-
set sales, articulated by the Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp., re-
quires only a motion, a hearing, and a court’s determination that the 
debtor has a sound business purpose for selling its assets.29  This test is 
designed to strike a balance between judicial discretion and creditor 
protection.30 
As this Comment demonstrates, the “sound business purpose” test 
is applied inconsistently throughout the nation.  Courts approach 
these cases using a variety of factors, which produces a large degree of 
variance in the weight given to each of these considerations.31  Per-
haps a more troubling observation, in light of the escalating and evolv-
ing criticism of § 363 sales, is that despite underlying congressional in-
tent32 and frequent judicial language indicating that good faith is one 
such salient factor to be considered, bankruptcy courts typically ex-
 
28 See, e.g., Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (discussing the use of the Chrysler 
precedent to restructure the National Hockey League’s Phoenix Coyotes through a 
§ 363 sale). 
29 722 F.2d 1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983).  
30 See id. at 1069 (“To further the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, a bank-
ruptcy judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his orders to meet differing cir-
cumstances.”).  At the same time, the Second Circuit recognized that § 363 does not 
grant “the bankruptcy judge carte blanche” to permit the sale, which would be inconsis-
tent with bankruptcy’s goal of protecting the rights of creditors and equity interests, 
specifically those of public investors with little bargaining power.  Id. at 1069-70. 
31 See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 418-19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (re-
cognizing that “venue selection based on a court’s perceived propensity to approve 
§ 363(b) sales . . . ha[s] altered the landscape of Chapter 11 in large cases”).  The 
court likened forum shopping based on treatment of critical-vendor programs to judi-
cial approval of § 363(b) sales.  See id. at 419 n.30 (“Choice of venue based on percep-
tion of judicial predisposition has been the subject of discussion in any number of fora 
including the popular press.  The Wall Street Journal ‘Bankruptcy Blog’ had the follow-
ing comment . . . :  ‘New York judges are . . . willing to go along with critical-vendor 
programs, while courts elsewhere, specifically in Chicago, take a different and dimmer 
view of them.’” (quoting Creditors Won’t Let Motor Coach Roll Over Them, WALL ST. J. 
BANKR. BEAT BLOG (Feb. 3, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/ 
2009/02/03/creditors-won’t-let-motor-coach-roll-over-them/)).  
32 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (indicating that good faith is a factor to consider in 
assessing the validity of a sale authorized under § 363). 
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amine good faith only as a faint afterthought.33  With the growing like-
lihood of abuse of § 363 sales to the detriment of creditors, it is discon-
certing that an analysis of good faith in these transactions has been 
subordinated to a very liberal application of the business purpose test. 
In reaction to the current criticism of large companies’ abuses of 
§ 363 sales, the change in the bankruptcy “landscape,” and inconsis-
tent treatment by bankruptcy courts, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp. enumerated 
thirteen factors to be weighed in determining whether to approve 
such a transaction.34  This Comment argues that bankruptcy judges 
should follow the Gulf Coast Oil factors as a model.  This test, which 
modifies previously recognized considerations and adds several new 
elements, strikes a sound balance between judicial discretion and ad-
herence to the goals of bankruptcy law while also giving the sound 
business purpose test teeth to address recent concerns of abuse.  By 
providing a more focused legal analysis, which pointedly implies a 
good faith requirement within its enumerated factors, this approach 
ensures an analysis of good faith as a potential remedy to ameliorate 
misuse of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview and evaluation of 
the sound business purpose test that courts employ in approving § 363 
sales.  Part II examines the significance of good faith in the bankrupt-
cy context by analyzing the differences between the meaning of good 
faith in Chapter 11 reorganizations and in the § 363 approval process.  
Additionally, this examination will illustrate the ramifications of ignor-
ing whether a transaction is pursued in good faith.  Finally, Part III 
analyzes Gulf Coast Oil and the framework that the court articulated.  
For the reasons outlined above, this Comment argues that this frame-
work provides a preferable model for evaluating § 363 proposals.  Be-
cause § 363 sales are so prominent across the nation, courts should 
reevaluate the broad discretion that the Bankruptcy Code confers 
upon them in order to guarantee that these sales promote creditor 
protection, an underlying principle of bankruptcy law,35 by ensuring 
that parties enter into these deals in good faith. 
 
33 See Rose, supra note 3, at 250 (warning that “vague good faith standards” weaken 
the judicial scrutiny necessary to combat the potential for abuse under § 363). 
34 404 B.R. at 422-27. 
35 The principles and goals of Chapter 11 include efficiency, maximizing value, 
preserving jobs, rehabilitating the business, and providing “[b]enefit [to] other parties 
affected by business failure.”  Rose, supra note 3, at 254 (citing NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW 
COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY:  THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1997)). 
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I.  THE WORLD OF § 363 SALES:  BUSINESS JUDGMENT,  
SUB ROSA, AND SWEETHEARTING 
The increasing popularity of § 363 sales as a substitute for true re-
organizations reflects a growing conflict between the underlying 
themes of corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 and the cursory 
obligations of debtors under § 363 sales.  While the use of these asset 
sales promotes efficiency and maximization of value, this strategy also 
has the potential to deviate from several goals of bankruptcy law, 
namely securing equal distribution among creditors of the same class 
and rehabilitating the business.36  As such, the law must somehow re-
concile this tension.  In hopes of protecting equity and creditor inter-
ests, courts have fashioned flexible evaluations37 to balance the author-
ity to sell all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets against the poten-
potential for abuse when parties evade Chapter 11’s safeguards.  This 
Part will provide a brief summary of judicial scrutiny of § 363 sales and 
the failures of these methods in detecting abuse. 
A.  The Sound Business Purpose Test 
In Lionel, which is presently recognized as the seminal case for the 
authorization of asset sales outside of a plan of reorganization, the 
Second Circuit addressed this tension through a comprehensive sur-
vey of the history behind asset sales in relation to the legislative 
scheme for corporate reorganizations.38  In response to the passage of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the court defined the role of the 
bankruptcy judge in authorizing § 363 sales and the subsequent stan-
dard the debtor must satisfy to achieve court approval.39 
 
36 Gerald F. Munitz, The Bankruptcy Power and Structure of the Bankruptcy Code (de-
scribing the several “pillars” of bankruptcy law, including equal distribution amongst 
creditors and rehabilitation that maintains a going concern business rather than liqui-
dation), in NUTS AND BOLTS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 2009, at 105, 112-13 (PLI 
COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE, COURSE HANDBOOK SER. No. A-918). 
37 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 474 (“Although the standards of review vary among 
the bankruptcy courts, the approaches are characteristically vague and therefore flexi-
ble enough to respond to the diverse needs of particular debtors.”). 
38 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1066-70 (2d Cir. 1983).  
39 The approach the Second Circuit took in resolving these questions is a signifi-
cant indication of both a legislative and a judicial intent to open access to these sales to 
a wide range of debtors.  However, the current controversies surrounding asset sales 
shed light on the continued expansion of § 363 that allows its use as an alternative to 
reorganization for distressed companies, a strategy that the Second Circuit most likely 
did not contemplate when deciding Lionel. 
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1.  Unfettered Discretion 
In Lionel, the Second Circuit noted that on its face, the Bankrupt-
cy Reform Act of 1978,40 unlike earlier bankruptcy laws, does not con-
strain courts in approving the sale of assets.41  Thus, the Act provides 
courts broad discretion to authorize such transactions.42  Accordingly, 
the statutory language of the 1978 Act reflects a legislative intent to 
craft a more efficient system of judicial involvement.  The statute con-
fers upon bankruptcy courts “the authority to intercede, either to 
prohibit or impose conditions on sales, thereby protecting the inter-
ests in the debtor estate or to facilitating [sic] the efforts of the trustee 
in consummating a sale.”43  This break from previous bankruptcy law,44 
which clearly favors a more flexible authorization of asset sales pur-
suant to § 363 with the purpose of maximizing the value of the estate, 
reduced judicial constraint.45 
The Second Circuit took account of certain policy considerations 
in interpreting § 363 to grant bankruptcy judges a discretionary role 
in the authorization of these transactions.  The court acknowledged 
that with the best interests of the estate as the ultimate consideration, 
the decisionmaker would have to bear in mind that each debtor’s sit-
uation was unique.46  Each distressed company has obligations to dif-
ferent creditors with varying interests, and thus, the likelihood of max-
imizing value for one debtor may necessitate a different method or 
 
40 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codifed as amended in scattered sections of 
11 and 28 U.S.C.). 
41 See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1067-69 (concluding that strict limitations upon a 
court’s authorization of a sale of a debtor’s property under previous statutes, like the 
“upon cause shown” standard pursuant to the Chandler Act of 1938, were not present 
in the statutory language of the 1978 Act). 
42 See id. at 1069 (“Section 363(b) of the Code seems on its face to confer upon the 
bankruptcy judge virtually unfettered discretion to authorize the use, sale or lease, 
other than in the ordinary course of business, of property of the estate.”). 
43 Jackson, supra note 2, at 473 (footnotes omitted).  Section 363(e) indicates a 
more limited judicial role in approving asset sales since an interested party must first 
request the court’s intervention.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006).  
44 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 473 n.112 (noting that § 363 was a “significant 
change from [existing] law, which require[d] the affirmative approval of the bank-
ruptcy judge for almost every action” (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. 95-
595, at 315 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6272)). 
45 See id. (observing that § 363 affords judges more freedom either to “facilitate or 
frustrate” sales). 
46 See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069 (“[T]he bankruptcy machinery should not 
straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to prevent him from doing what is best for 
the estate.”). 
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timeline than for another.47  Therefore, the court affirmed that “[t]o 
further the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, a bankruptcy 
judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his order to meet differ-
ing circumstances.”48 
At the same time, however, the court refused to interpret the sta-
tute to permit judicial approval of these asset sales without some form 
of scrutiny.  Granting bankruptcy judges “carte blanche” was not an op-
tion since that would render the notice and hearing requirements su-
perfluous; interested parties would know nothing about the rationale 
underlying the court’s decision to authorize a sale.49  Furthermore, 
some standard for granting approval was necessary to assuage the fear 
that authorization of these sales would put certain creditors and 
stockholders with little bargaining power, even with the Chapter 11 
safeguards, at even more of a disadvantage.50  In effectuating the goals 
of Chapter 11, including the maximization of enterprise value and  
efficiency, a § 363 sale must not impede the rights of creditors and 
equity holders by completely circumventing Chapter 11’s safeguards.  
The Second Circuit therefore concluded that it was the bankruptcy 
judge’s duty to scrutinize these proposals in order to protect these 
parties.51  The sound business purpose test emanated out of this  
balance between avoiding a judicial “straightjacket”52 and providing 
adequate scrutiny in order to protect the interests of all parties. 
2.  Business Justification and the Relevant Factors 
In Lionel, the Second Circuit reviewed a bankruptcy judge’s autho-
rization of Lionel Corporation’s plan to sell its most valuable asset, an 
 
47 See id. (noting that imposing strict rules upon exercising power to authorize as-
set sales may prohibit parties from acting quickly, resulting in the wasting away of an 
asset’s value); see also In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ex-
plaining that “if a favorable business opportunity is presented that is only available if 
acted upon quickly,” the court must have the discretion to authorize the sale if it will 
maximize value for the estate), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub 
nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
48 In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 1069-70 (noting that allowing § 363(b) to “swallow[] up Chapter 11’s 
safeguards” completely could jeopardize the interests of creditors and stockholders, 
particularly scattered public investors who were of particular concern in the passage of 
the 1978 Act). 
51 See id. at 1071 (“[T]here must be some articulate business justification . . . for 
using, selling or leasing property out of the ordinary course of business before the 
bankruptcy judge may order such disposition under section 363(b).”). 
52 Id. at 1069. 
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eighty-two percent interest in Dale, a profitable manufacturer of elec-
tronic components.53  The bankruptcy judge affirmed the sale based 
on the Creditors’ Committee’s support for the auction of this stock 
despite that there was no potential for a decrease in the asset’s value if 
the sale occurred in the future as part of the reorganization plan.54  
Thus, the Second Circuit, in determining whether to affirm the sale’s 
authorization, had to resolve the basic conflict between maximizing 
the value of Lionel’s asset to fund its plan of reorganization and per-
mitting the debtor to sell its most profitable asset at the expense of the 
safeguards provided by Chapter 11. 
With this conflict in mind, the court concluded that a judge may 
authorize the sale of an asset prior to a plan of reorganization that is 
out of the ordinary course of business under § 363 if the debtor has 
articulated “a good business reason to grant such an application.”55  
This test has been equated to state corporate law’s “business judgment 
rule,” under which “great deference is given to a business in determin-
ing its own best interests.”56  However, in determining that the “ap-
peasement of major creditors” alone does not constitute a good busi-
ness reason for judicial approval of a § 363 sale, the Second Circuit 
implied that the business justification in the bankruptcy context must 
take into account equity and creditor interests, in addition to the 
business’s interests.57 
The sound business purpose test that the Second Circuit pro-
nounced, supplemented by the sub rosa doctrine,58 has become the 
 
53 Id. at 1065-66. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1070-71. 
56 In re W.A. Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). 
57 See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071 (asserting that support by the Creditors’ Com-
mittee was “insufficient as a matter of law because it ignores the equity interests re-
quired to be weighed and considered under Chapter 11”). 
58 As articulated by the Fifth Circuit, the sub rosa doctrine provides that a pro-
posed § 363 sale cannot “gut the bankruptcy estate before reorganization 
or . . . change the fundamental nature of the estate’s assets in such a way that limits a 
future reorganization plan.”  Bergemann v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & 
Wilcox Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 960 (5th Cir. 2001).  In theory, the sub rosa doctrine pro-
vides an additional method of objecting to a § 363 sale by claiming that the plan side-
steps the protections of Chapter 11 by dictating any future plan of reorganization.  See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 
F.2d 935, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a plan to sell assets was sub rosa because 
the transaction materially interfered with the scheme of creditor enfranchisement that 
would normally proceed under Chapter 11 and, similarly, would control distributions 
allocated in a future plan).  Opponents of sales still advance this doctrine and assert 
that the transaction in question, though masked as a § 363 sale, is truly a reorganiza-
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generally accepted standard by which debtors proposing § 363 sales 
are required to establish “a good, sound business justification for con-
ducting the sale before confirmation . . . , that there has been ade-
quate and reasonable notice of the sale, that the sale has been pro-
posed in good faith, and that the purchase price is fair and 
reasonable.”59  In finding that pacification of certain creditors was not 
a good business justification for approving the sale of Lionel’s most 
valuable asset, the court set out relevant factors to consider, including 
(1) “the proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole,” (2) 
“the amount of elapsed time since the filing,” (3) “the likelihood that 
a plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near 
future,” (4) “the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of 
reorganization,” (5) “proceeds to be obtained from the disposition vis-
a-vis any appraisals of the property,” (6) “which of the alternatives of 
use, sale or lease the proposal envisions,” and (7) “whether the asset is 
increasing or decreasing in value.”60 
These factors directly address the conflict between enabling credi-
tors to vote on the confirmation of a reorganization plan, providing 
them with the leverage necessary to negotiate and protect their own 
interests, and granting the use of § 363 to liquidate a debtor’s assets.  
Moreover, the court designed this standard to guide judges in the use 
of their discretion, rather than to provide a stringent list of considera-
tions to be analyzed.61  Whether the proposed sale constitutes a sub 
rosa plan depends on “the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will 
 
tion and so, a means of evading the plan confirmation process.  See, e.g., Institutional 
Creditors of Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.), 
780 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1986) (vacating the district court’s order approving a 
§ 363 sale and remanding to determine whether the sale may have denied “creditors 
the protection they would receive if the proposals were first raised in the reorganiza-
tion plan”); Rosenberg Real Estate Equity Fund III v. Air Beds, Inc. (In re Air Beds, 
Inc.), 92 B.R. 419, 422 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (concluding “that the bankruptcy court 
abused its discretion because the order allowing the distribution of the sale proceeds 
allows the debtor to circumvent the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for the admin-
istration of a case under Chapter 11”).  But see, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating L.L.C.), 478 F.3d 452, 466-67 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that a settlement agreement, by which lenders would receive $92.5 mil-
lion and another $37.5 million would be allocated to a newly organized litigation enti-
ty, was not sub rosa because it enhanced the likelihood of confirmation of the plan ra-
ther than for the purpose of evading it); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 495-
98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that a sale of assets that treats creditors une-
qually does not amount to a sub rosa plan because regardless of this disparate treat-
ment, it still transforms assets into cash to maximize value of the company).  
59 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 417-18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
60 In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071. 
61 Id.  
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be proposed and confirmed in the near future” and “the effect of the 
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization.”62  These fac-
tors evaluate whether the § 363 sale “has potential to lead toward con-
firmation of a plan and is not to evade the plan confirmation process” 
and thus aid in determining whether the proponent of the transaction 
has advanced a proper business justification.63 
The last factor, namely the fluctuation of the asset in question’s 
value, has been characterized as the most salient consideration be-
cause the history of bankruptcy law indicates that a sale is appropriate 
to prevent a depreciating asset from jeopardizing the goal of maximiz-
ing the value of the estate.64  Analysis of this factor in Lionel—notably 
the only factor the Second Circuit’s majority opinion examined be-
sides the inadequacy of the proceeds of the sale—was determinative in 
establishing that there was no good business justification for the sale 
because the common stock to be sold was not deteriorating in value.65  
In contrast, the court in In re Baldwin United Corp. found that the deb-
tor articulated a sound business justification for selling a partnership 
interest constituting forty percent of its assets where the nature of 
such interest would, if not sold promptly, only impede reorganization 
and would lose value as an asset in the long term.66  Thus, without the 
urgent need to sell an asset that is quickly decreasing in value, courts 
may conclude that it is in the best interest of the estate to delay the 
sale until the confirmation of a reorganization plan in order to max-
imize the proceeds to be distributed among creditors.  Under this test, 
judges mold their decisions to the unique circumstances surrounding 
each debtor’s case, using the factors to determine how to satisfy the 
objectives of bankruptcy law. 
 
62 Id. 
63 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
64 See id. at 94 (reviewing previous requirements that prior to the sale of estate as-
sets, debtors had to establish that the assets were either “perishable” or would deteri-
orate in value in the absence of prompt action). 
65 See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071-72 (explaining objections to the sale, including 
that “the sale was premature because Dale is not a wasting asset . . . [and] there was no 
justifiable cause present since Dale, if anything, is improving”). 
66 See In re Baldwin United Corp., 43 B.R. 888, 905-06 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) 
(“[T]he fair value of the partnership interest can only be realized by selling it, 
and . . . the Ameritrust proposal provides the best opportunity presently available for 
realizing that fair value.”). 
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B.  Evaluating the Sound Business Purpose Test  
Against the Goals of Chapter 11 
Due to the flexible nature of the sound business purpose test, 
judges give a range of considerations different weight in deciding 
whether to approve § 363 sales, despite a clear pattern of “reoccurring 
business justifications.”67  Scrutiny under this test tends to be cursory 
and superficial.  Courts liberally defer to the debtor’s business judg-
ment without undertaking a comprehensive discussion of the factors 
enumerated in Lionel.68  Deference to management serving as debtor-
in-possession is common because courts view management’s expertise 
and relationships within the industry as significant in maximizing the 
company’s value.69  Although such expertise is certainly persuasive, the 
process is vulnerable to abuse because of the acceleration of an asset 
sale under § 363, as well as the debtor’s disproportionate control over 
the sale due to the absence of creditor confirmation.70  The current 
system of judicial approval of § 363 sales, in particular the deferential 
and inconsistent standard applied throughout the nation, has engen-
dered much criticism.  In particular, critics charge that it allows unfair 
deals to slip through the cracks of the business justification scheme 
and, more recently, that it permits large companies to make unprece-
dented end runs around creditors who are already in disadvantaged 
bargaining positions.71 
In theory, the sound business purpose test and sub rosa doctrine 
have balanced the disclosure and confirmation requirements of Chap-
ter 11 and the streamlined process under § 363.  However, empirical 
 
67 See Rose, supra note 3, at 269 (averring that courts typically approve certain justi-
fications including “[s]ales that allow the debtor to avoid unnecessary administrative 
costs, sales where time is of the essence, and sales that preserve the going concern val-
ue of the business”). 
68 See id. at 268 (“[C]ourts have continued to evaluate plans inconsistently and of-
ten rely on Braniff, Lionel, and Continental as a basis for mere factual comparison.”).  As a 
result of judges’ discretion in authorizing § 363 sales, written opinions often fail to flesh 
out all of the relevant factors in relation to the particular circumstances of the case.  See, 
e.g., In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071-72 (objecting to the sale on the basis of two of the rele-
vant factors without addressing others that may have been pertinent to the decision).  
69 See Rose, supra note 3, at 271 (“A consistent theme in the courts’ assessment of 
business justification is the debtor’s superior position in liquidation efforts. . . . Deference 
to the debtor’s expertise and connections is especially common with complex business 
structures and specialized industries.”). 
70 See id. at 263 (“[D]isproportionate leverage in an accelerated sale . . . gives the 
debtor the opportunity for unfair dealing.”). 
71 See id. at 272 (“The lax standards used to evaluate these sales have contributed 
to some of the most corrupt and egregious acts by mega-companies in our country’s 
history.”). 
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evidence indicates that “§ 363 insider dealing occurs with dispropor-
tionate frequency when compared to chapter 11 confirmed plans.”72  
The participation of the debtor’s management in negotiating asset 
sales with prospective purchasers, along with the speed and lack of 
transparency in this process,73 leaves room for potential self-dealing 
that may go undetected without cautious judicial consideration of 
which groups are benefiting from these sales.  Such potential for 
abuse calls for increased scrutiny at the bankruptcy court level, rather 
than later in the appellate process, because § 363(m) requires an ap-
pellant either to obtain a stay on the closing of a sale pending appeal or 
to allege that the purchaser has undertaken the transaction in bad 
faith.74  The limited ability to appeal once a sale has been authorized 
therefore increases the potential for abuse, a danger exacerbated where 
parties typically close sales immediately after receiving court approval.75 
Despite certain cases in which potential self-dealers have been 
caught red-handed by bankruptcy courts,76 classes of creditors and 
public investors alike have been held at the mercy of debtors and bid-
ders who have utilized the sound business purpose test to their own 
 
72 Rose, supra note 3, at 277 (citing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 175 
(2005)). 
73 See Rose, supra note 3, at 280 (“The debtor’s ability to manipulate the value of 
the business is more of a vulnerability in § 363(b) sales because of the lack of transpa-
rency and the accelerated speed of the process.”). 
74 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-
thorization . . . of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or 
lease . . . to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith . . . unless 
such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.”).   
75 See Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commenta-
tors Just as Economic Conditions Make Them More Important than Ever (“Once Section 363 
sales were approved by the bankruptcy court, parties would quickly close the sale.  
Upon closing, appeal of the order approving the sale was virtually impossible.”), in 
BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009, at 39, 43 (2009); see 
also Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals:  The Impact of 
Procedural Uncertainty on Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 571-72 (2011) (not-
ing that the doctrine of equitable mootness may prevent Article III review of bankrupt-
cy court orders if the bankruptcy court does not grant a stay pending appeal).  
76 In In re Biderman Indus. U.S.A., Inc., the court was faced with whether to approve 
a letter agreement authorizing a leveraged buyout of the debtor by two companies.  
203 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).  The CEO of the debtor-in-possession was to 
be employed by one of the purchasers.  Id. at 549.  As a result of this conflict of inter-
est, the court would not authorize the sale without an assessment of the fairness of the 
transaction.  Id. at 554.  Notably, the court did not analyze this potential sale under the 
sound business purpose test after there was evidence of potential self-dealing. Some 
courts will analyze § 363 sales under several of the relevant factors without taking note 
of any potential for self-dealing or manipulation, which, as demonstrated below, can 
lead to inconsistency.  See infra Section II.B. 
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personal advantage.77  In Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., Enron 
Wind Corporation and its domestic subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy 
in relation to its parent corporation’s bankruptcy and proceeded to 
seek approval of a proposed sale agreement in which General Electric 
Co. would purchase substantially all of the corporation’s assets as well 
as assets of several solvent European subsidiaries.78  Although conflict 
arose over the allocation of cash payment for these assets between the 
U.S. and European subsidiaries, the bankruptcy court, without reaching 
the merits of the case, deferred to Enron Wind’s business judgment.79 
Review of the preplan sale by the district court illustrates the po-
tential for abuse that results from complete deference to a debtor’s 
business judgment.  The potential for self-dealing was apparent in this 
case, yet the bankruptcy court overlooked it.80  In finding that Enron 
Wind was receiving a fair price for its assets, the court superficially 
took account of just one of the factors pronounced in Lionel.  The 
bankruptcy court failed to scrutinize whether the allocation of the 
proceeds was fair and reasonable, and thus in the best interests of the 
creditors.81  If the bankruptcy court had undertaken a more compre-
hensive scrutiny of the deal, it would have discovered that because 
Enron Corp., the parent corporation, had been the sole entity nego-
tiating the transaction with General Electric Co., Enron may have pos-
sessed a special interest in apportioning more of the proceeds to its 
European subsidiaries in an effort to redirect the flow of this money, 
which was now free of claims, to itself.82  Although the district court 
identified the importance of addressing “the possibility that the allo-
 
77 See Rose, supra note 3, at 277-78 (describing the authorization of an asset sale by 
Polaroid that caused controversy because several members of Polaroid’s management 
and other parties involved in the deal personally benefitted by retaining an equity in-
terest in the purchaser’s business while the asset sold was severely underpriced).  
78 Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
79 Id. at 41.  Under the proposal, Enron Wind would receive approximately thirty-
seven percent of the $325 million cash payment while sixty-three percent would be al-
lotted to its solvent European subsidiaries despite creditor objection to this allocation.  
Id.  According to this allocation, “monies paid to the European Asset Sellers would 
then flow back to Enron Wind—free . . . of further claims by the creditors of its subsid-
iaries . . . —from whence such funds could flow to the parent Enron Corp. and its cred-
itors.”  Id. at 43. 
80 Id. at 43. 
81 See id. (“[A]lthough the Bankruptcy Court did find that the total compensation 
paid . . . was fair and reasonable, it explicitly avoided any analysis of the allocation it-
self, believing that this was a matter of deference to the parties’ business judgment.” 
(citations omitted)). 
82 See id. (explaining the need for “meaningful scrutiny” of the allocation of 
proceeds to address the possibility of self-dealing). 
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cation may have been infected by self-dealing on the part of Enron 
Corp.” in time to resolve the issue partially in favor of the creditors,83 
this deference to a debtor’s business judgment in “conclusory fa-
shion”84 is disconcertingly widespread.  With such great interests at 
stake, these accelerated sales, characterized by less disclosure and few-
er expenses, must not come at the expense of circumventing the goals 
of Chapter 11, including those of equal distribution and creditor pro-
tection.  Recognizing that a sound business judgment must take ac-
count of all interests, not just those of the debtor’s business,85 broad 
deference to the party holding the most control over the transaction 
under § 363 certainly increases the likelihood of unfair dealing. 
Moreover, recent criticism of the approval of Chrysler’s § 363 sale 
has shed light on yet another way in which the sound business pur-
pose test may sidestep creditor protection.  In April 2009, Chrysler 
LLC and 24 of its subsidiaries (Chrysler) filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 after recording a net loss of $16.8 billion in 2008.86  As re-
quired by Chrysler’s acceptance of $4 billion in TARP financing,87 
Chrysler pursued a Viability Plan that involved:  (1) Chrysler transfer-
ring substantially all of its operating assets to New CarCo (New Chrys-
ler), a limited liability company set up by Fiat as an alliance entity, and 
(2) assumption of certain liabilities and $2 billion in cash to be paid to 
Chrysler in exchange for those assets.88  According to this prenego-
tiated deal, first-priority secured creditors holding approximately $6.9 
billion in claims would receive twenty-nine cents on the dollar in ex-
change for the transfer of their collateral to New Chrysler.89  Secured 
creditors, including certain Indiana funds, advanced one of the major 
objections to the proposed preplan sale:  that the sale benefited cer-
 
83 See id. at 42-43 (noting that although the exchange had already been consum-
mated, the cash proceeds could potentially be redistributed to the extent that the 
funds had returned to the debtors). 
84 Id. at 43. 
85 See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983) (indicating the importance of considering interests of 
public investors in addition to the debtor’s own interests). 
86 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
87 Id. at 90. 
88 Id. at 92. 
89 Id. at 93. 
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tain unsecured creditors more than those with collateral.90  As such, 
these creditors argued that the sale would incorrectly prioritize those 
claims in violation of the Code.91 
Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez applied the sound business 
purpose test and concluded that Chrysler had asserted a sound busi-
ness justification for the sale of its assets outside of a reorganization 
plan.92  The basis for this determination emanated from the Lionel fac-
tors.  First, the court found that the sale of substantially all of Chrys-
ler’s assets to Fiat, who had an interest in New Chrysler, was the only 
currently viable option because immediate liquidation would result in 
less value to be distributed amongst creditors.93  Thus, maximization 
of value called for the sale of the whole enterprise, as opposed to pie-
cemeal fire sales of its assets.94  Second, Judge Gonzalez determined 
that prompt action was required to prevent substantial costs from ac-
cruing due to the loss of skilled workers and erosion of consumer con-
fidence.95  Finally, immediate action was necessary to preserve, at min-
imum, part of the going concern value of the business since 
governmental financing of the transaction would be cut off if the sale 
did not close quickly and Fiat’s offer would expire if the sale did not 
close by a certain date.96  Furthermore, the court rejected one secured 
creditor’s argument that the sale constituted a bad faith transaction.97  
 
90 See id. (asserting that certain secured lenders would receive less value for their 
collateral than what such collateral would be worth when later sold to New Chrysler, 
while unsecured creditors, like the UAW, would receive more value). 
91 See Richard A. Epstein, The Deadly Sins of the Chrysler Bankruptcy, FORBES.COM 
(May 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/11/chrysler-bankruptcy-
mortgage-opinions-columnists-epstein.html (“[T]he established priorities of creditor 
claims outside bankruptcy have been cast aside in this bankruptcy case as the unse-
cured claims of the union health pension plan have received a better deal than the se-
cured claims of various bond holders, some of which may represent pension plans of 
their own.”). 
92 See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 96 (asserting that the Fiat transaction was the 
only viable option at the time). 
93 Id.  
94 See id. (“[T]he terms of the Fiat Transaction present an opportunity that the 
marketplace alone could not offer, and that certainly exceeds the liquidation value.”). 
95 See id. (listing various costs resulting from any “material delay” in resuming pro-
duction). 
96 See id. at 96 (indicating that delay may have “vitiate[d] several vital agreements” 
and that various constituents and creditors required and relied on prompt action). 
97 See id. at 106-08 (rejecting the assertion that the U.S. Treasury improperly acted 
as an “insider” by controlling both debtors and New Chrysler without possessing the 
authority to enter into these transactions).  Significantly, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the conclusion of the lower court and rejected the bad faith argument.  See In re Chrys-
ler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the record did not support 
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The court found that the debtors acted in accordance with their fidu-
ciary duty in choosing “the only option available other than piecemeal 
liquidation”98 and no evidence of “fraud, collusion or attempts ‘to take 
grossly unfair advantage of other bidders’ [were] present.”99  Fur-
thermore, the court found the allegation that the U.S. Treasury acted 
as an “insider” of the debtors unfounded because Chrysler’s assets 
were extensively marketed for two years, the government did not act 
to preclude other entities from participating or negotiating in the 
sale, and the Treasury did not control the debtors.100 
The Second Circuit upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, af-
firming that an analysis of the Lionel factors provided a good business 
reason for the § 363 sale of Chrysler.101  The court noted that the sale 
would in no way offend the priority rules of bankruptcy because 
“[t]he lien holders’ security interests would attach to all proceeds of 
the Sale”102 and, significantly, any new value arising from the operation 
of New Chrysler would be derived from new assets, such as new man-
agement, that were not previously attached to the secured creditors’ 
collateral.103  The Second Circuit also emphasized the clear presence 
of the deterioration of the going concern value of Chrysler and the 
consequent need for a prompt sale of the business.104 
Although the courts engaged in a thorough analysis of Chrysler’s 
business judgment, commentators criticize the courts involved in au-
thorizing this transaction for allowing § 363 sales as substitutes for  
reorganization and for denying creditors the right to actively nego-
tiate to enhance their own interests.105  The courts made it clear that 
 
a finding that majority lenders were coerced into the sale), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. 
State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
98 In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 97. 
99 Id. at 106 (quoting Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 
380, 390 (2d Cir. 1997)).  However, on petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme 
Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit “with in-
structions to dismiss the appeal as moot.”  Chrysler, 130 S. Ct. at 1015.  
100 Id. at 107-108. 
101 See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118-19 (agreeing with the “linchpin” of the bank-
ruptcy court’s analysis). 
102 Id. at 118. 
103 Id. at 119. 
104 See id. (“With its revenues sinking, its factories dark, and its massive debts grow-
ing, Chrysler fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube.”).  In fact, the court pointed to 
expert testimony asserting that Chrysler’s going concern value was declining by nearly 
$100 million each day.  Id. 
105 See Skeel, supra note 25 (criticizing the use of § 363 in the Chrysler bankruptcy 
as a “sham sale”); cf. Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (“The Obama administration’s plan 
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the asset sale was necessary to preserve the going concern value of 
Chrysler and that delay of the confirmation process would likely de-
stroy value in the form of both assets and jobs.  Lenders, hedge funds, 
and other investors, however, may rightfully be concerned that recent 
cases similar to Chrysler have established precedent jeopardizing their 
interests.106  Although the use of § 363 as a vehicle to salvage the value 
of a going concern is arguably an economically efficient alternative 
that, in certain cases, ultimately benefits creditors through larger dis-
tributions, efficiency should not take precedence over the law.  The 
Bankruptcy Code calls for measures of creditor protection, as exem-
plified by the disclosure and creditor approval requirements of reor-
ganization plans, and for this reason, safeguards against self-dealing 
and abuse should be incorporated within the Lionel framework.  Dras-
tic increases in the use of § 363 sales as a method of reorganization, 
changes in the economy that are sure to continue in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, and the potential for abuse under this provision 
demand a reevaluation of Lionel ’s sound business purpose test.  A 
more stringent good faith analysis within the sound business purpose 
test is a strong step in the direction of ameliorating these concerns.  
The next Part will examine the various approaches and the signific-
ance of scrutinizing good faith within bankruptcy law. 
II.  GOOD FAITH IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT:   
IS BUSINESS JUDGMENT SUFFICIENT? 
After gaining an understanding of the fundamental objectives and 
policies underlying the authorization of § 363 sales and corporate  
reorganizations more generally, it becomes apparent that in the face 
of the tensions inherent in these transactions, good faith may be the 
cement that holds the bankruptcy structure together.  Despite the fact 
that courts frequently and troublingly gloss over the issue of good 
faith when approving § 363 sales, “[e]very bankruptcy statute since 
1898 has incorporated literally, or by judicial interpretation, a stan-
dard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution, and confir-
mation of bankruptcy proceedings.”107  As courts of equity, with the 
 
for pushing through Chrysler’s restructuring has been criticized by some for going too 
quickly, which led to an end run around creditors, who got little say in the process.”). 
106 Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (“‘How do these folks make investment decisions 
when they’re faced with bankruptcy courts that appear to disregard the rules?’” (quot-
ing Stephen Lerner, Attorney, Ad Hoc Committee of Chrysler Affected Dealers)). 
107 Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. 
Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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authority to use tools such as the turnover of assets,108 bankruptcy 
courts employ the good faith standard to ensure that the benefits of 
filing for bankruptcy are afforded only to parties with “clean hands.”109  
Furthermore, the good faith requirement balances the competing in-
terests of debtors, creditors, and equity holders.  By placing the deb-
tor’s motives in the spotlight, courts attempt to balance the bargaining 
positions of the parties and undertake the responsibility of preventing 
the manipulation of bankruptcy law.110  For these reasons, a survey of 
courts’ definitions of good faith within the bankruptcy context is es-
sential to understanding how a good faith requirement can serve to 
reconcile the tension between Chapter 11 reorganizations and § 363 
sales in an effort to thwart abuse. 
 A.  Good Faith in Corporate Reorganizations 
Although Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly 
require that petitioners file for bankruptcy in good faith,111 the courts 
have interpreted the statute to include a good faith requirement to 
further the central policies of debtor rehabilitation and creditor pro-
tection.112  Good faith in this context focuses on whether a debtor 
seeks to achieve a purpose “outside the legitimate scope of the bank-
ruptcy laws.”113  Courts, however, are split over whether subjective bad 
faith is sufficient to establish bad faith or whether the good faith stan-
 
108 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940). 
109 In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072; see also In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The ‘good faith’ requirement for Chapter 11 petitioners 
has strong roots in equity.”). 
110 See In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072 (noting that the good faith re-
quirement “legitimize[s] delays and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy,” “pre-
vents abuse of the bankruptcy process by debtors,” and “protects the jurisdictional in-
tegrity of the bankruptcy courts”). 
111 Much of the discussion of what constitutes a bad faith filing under Chapter 11 
revolves around § 1112(b).  This provision requires a court to “convert a case under 
this chapter to a case under Chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever 
is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, if the movant establishes cause.”  11 
U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2006). 
112 See Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11:  Standard that Should Be Employed 
to Dismiss Bad Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 TENN. L. REV. 525, 525-26 (1993) (discussing 
how the tension within the case law between debtor rehabilitation and creditor protec-
tion has shaped courts’ interpretations of what constitutes good faith in corporate re-
organizations). 
113 Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Con-
nell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (“[T]here must be some relation . . . between the Chapter 11 plan and the 
reorganization-related purposes that the chapter was designed to serve.”). 
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dard includes both subjective and objective considerations.114  In light 
of the tension between “the need for permitting a debtor sufficient la-
titude to reorganize and the need for creditor protection,”115 the 
courts have leaned toward a flexible standard of good faith, which 
coincides with the heavily factual, case-specific inquiries bankruptcy 
judges typically employ.116 
Several courts have held that subjective bad faith—a finding that 
the debtor endeavored to abuse the bankruptcy system by filing for 
Chapter 11 protection—is a sufficient reason for dismissal.117  Under 
this narrow approach, a court will focus on a debtor’s motives for fil-
ing and will find bad faith where there is “a pattern of concealment, 
evasion and direct violations of the Code or court order which clearly 
establishes an improper motive.”118  In such cases, debtor behavior 
such as acting evasively, manipulating assets, or filing primarily to fru-
strate a secured creditor will be enough to establish bad faith,119 even 
where there is a likelihood of successful reorganization.120 
While this interpretation of good faith acts as a strong means of 
creditor protection, this approach ignores another fundamental poli-
cy behind Chapter 11.  By dismissing cases where reorganization is 
possible, this tactic fails to give financially distressed companies the 
opportunity to continue operations and emerge from bankruptcy as a 
going concern.121  To balance these two policies, other courts have 
employed a less rigid standard that takes into account both the deb-
tor’s subjective intentions and “all of the facts and circumstances of 
 
114 See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 528-29 (identifying courts that apply an “objec-
tive-subjective test” and those that apply a “subjective good faith test”). 
115 Cuevas, supra note 112, at 531. 
116 See Rose, supra note 3, at 273-75 (describing the trend away from the narrow, 
intent-to-reorganize standard toward a more flexible interpretation that requires a 
case-specific inquiry). 
117 See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 532-33 (detailing cases in which courts have dis-
missed Chapter 11 cases on the sole basis of the debtor’s intent to frustrate creditors 
and the bankruptcy process in general).   
118 First Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Kerr (In re Kerr), 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 
1990).   
119 See id. (determining that violating court orders, commingling assets, and filing 
frivolous motions constituted bad faith and grounds to dismiss the debtor’s petition). 
120 See Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, 
Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The possibility of a successful reorgan-
ization cannot transform a bad faith filing into one undertaken in good faith.”). 
121 See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 533-34 (“[U]nder the subjective test, once subjec-
tive bad faith is established then the prospect of a successful reorganization is irrele-
vant.  Dismissal, under these circumstances, is contrary to the policies of open access 
and financial rehabilitation of distressed companies.” (footnote omitted)).  
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the case.”122  Courts will evaluate various objective factors to determine 
whether a debtor possesses a rehabilitative purpose because, if not, 
the “statutory provisions designed to accomplish the reorganization 
objective become destructive of the legitimate rights and interests of 
creditors.”123  Thus, an analysis of the debtor’s financial condition and 
plan to reorganize is considered a significant indication of the deb-
tor’s subjective intent and whether the filing falls within the legitimate 
scope of bankruptcy law . 
In In re SGL Carbon Corp., a manufacturer and seller of graphite 
electrodes facing potential civil antitrust liability filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 and made it explicitly known that its primary pur-
pose for filing was protection against the plaintiffs’ demands.124  In re-
sponse to the unsecured creditor committee’s motion to dismiss the 
petition on grounds of bad faith, the Third Circuit concluded that 
SGL Carbon’s filing lacked “a valid reorganizational purpose” and 
therefore dismissed the case.125  Despite noting that debtors may pos-
sess a valid reorganizational purpose based on the concern that pend-
ing litigation may severely jeopardize business operations, the Court 
held that SGL Carbon had filed prematurely because the company 
was still financially viable.126  After examining the objective conditions 
surrounding the filing—the realities of the debtor’s financial situation 
and the stated purpose for the petition— the court determined that 
SGL Carbon improperly intended to use bankruptcy law as a litigation 
strategy.127  Accordingly, a debtor’s “intended use of chapter 11 pro-
 
122 In re Adler, 329 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re SGL Carbon 
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (examining “the totality of facts and circums-
tances to determine whether they support a finding of good faith”); Little Creek Dev. 
Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1074 
(5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that a good faith examination requires judges to investi-
gate “‘all the particular facts and circumstances in each case,’” including the debtor’s 
financial condition (quoting Meadowbrook Investors’ Grp. v. Thirtieth Place, Inc. (In 
re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983))).  Cuevas refers to this 
standard as the “totality of the circumstances test.”  Cuevas, supra note 112, at 534-35. 
123 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of In-
wood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987); see also In re SGL Carbon, 200 
F.3d at 167 (using an assessment of the debtor’s reorganization plan to work backward in 
evaluating whether the debtor’s motives included unfair treatment of creditors). 
124 In re SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 156-58. 
125 Id. at 169. 
126 Id. at 164. 
127 See id. at 163, 165 (“SGL Carbon has offered no evidence it could not effectively 
use [Chapter 11] protections as the prospect of . . . a judgment becomes imminent.”); 
see also Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
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tections”128 is a significant element of the good faith requirement, 
since it can demonstrate whether “the debtor objectively ha[d] no 
reasonable prospect of reorganizing” and whether the debtor subjec-
tively intended the Chapter 11 petition as a means of “harming credi-
tors or abusing the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”129 
It is important to realize, however, that filing for Chapter 11 in 
good faith means more than having a “valid reorganizational pur-
pose.”  In In re Laguna Associates, the Sixth Circuit set forth several re-
levant factors to aid the courts in determining whether the debtor has 
filed in bad faith, including when “the debtor has one asset; . . . the 
pre-petition conduct of the debtor has been improper; . . .  the debtor 
has no ongoing business or employees; and . . . the lack of possibility 
of reorganization.”130  This examination of both subjective and objec-
tive factors, in addition to the ability to reorganize, suggests that 
Chapter 11’s good faith requirement is designed to address the under-
lying goals of the Bankruptcy Code in a comprehensive manner.  Bad 
faith is not limited to frustration of creditors and other interested par-
ties;131 it is also concerned with the broader issue of honoring the ob-
jectives of bankruptcy law as voiced by Congress.  The concept of good 
faith within Chapter 11 strikes a balance between the protection of 
creditors and debtors alike and, in doing so, aims to protect the inte-
grity of Chapter 11’s scope from manipulation. 
B.  Good Faith Under § 363 
Courts have extended the flexible, case-by-case analysis of good 
faith adopted in the corporate reorganization arena to preplan liqui-
dation of assets under § 363.132  More specifically, one element that the 
 
that a debtor who had financial means to pay restitution judgment to her ex-husband 
used the Chapter 11 petition as a litigation tactic in bad faith). 
128 Rose, supra note 3, at 273. 
129 Cuevas, supra note 112, at 529. 
130 Laguna Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (In re Laguna Assocs. 
Ltd. P’ship), 30 F.3d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 1994). 
131 See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 536 (noting how totality-of-the-circumstances 
good faith examinations ensure that the bankruptcy process benefits all parties, includ-
ing the debtor and creditors, and take into account “the impact of the corporate reor-
ganization case on society”). 
132 See, e.g., NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express, Inc. (In re Inte-
grated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 120 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Yet liquidation 
plans, no less than reorganization plans, must serve a valid bankruptcy pur-
pose. . . . [T]hey must either preserve some going concern value . . . or . . . maximiz[e] 
the value of the debtor’s estate.”). 
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proponents of a § 363 sale are expected to establish is “that the sale 
has been proposed in good faith.”133  The statutory authority for this 
good faith requirement stems from provision § 363(m) of the Code, 
which states: 
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under sub-
section (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not 
affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity 
that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such enti-
ty knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and 
such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.
134
 
Consequently, good faith remains significant under § 363 since an 
opponent of a sale will retain the ability to appeal an approval of an as-
set sale only if the opponent raises an objection to the good faith of the 
purchaser involved in the transaction or if the sale is stayed, a seeming-
ly difficult pursuit when closings typically occur immediately after judi-
cial approval.135  Section 363 sales’ expedited process and lesser disclo-
sure requirements make investigation of the purchaser’s behavior vital 
in order to protect creditors, equity holders, and debtors from exploi-
tation.  Increased potential for abuse threatens creditors’ interests as 
well as the debtor’s ability to maximize the value of the estate.  There-
fore, in theory, efforts to prevent fraud and inequitable deals should 
escalate to a new level of import for court approval of § 363 sales. 
Where courts have undertaken a specific analysis of good faith in 
the context of approving § 363 sales, they focus more on the detection 
of collusion and unfair dealing rather than the more general deter-
mination of whether a debtor’s purpose for filing bankruptcy com-
ports with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code.136  An analysis of a party’s 
status as a good faith purchaser turns on whether the purchaser has 
engaged in any fraudulent or collusive conduct including “‘fraud, col-
 
133 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 418 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
134 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (emphasis added). 
135 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
136 See Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. (In re Abbotts Dai-
ries of Pa., Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986) (“‘The requirement that a purchaser 
act in good faith . . . speaks to the integrity of his conduct in the course of the sale pro-
ceedings.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp. 572 F.2d 1195, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1978))).  With the objective of encouraging bidders to participate in these 
auctions, courts seem to be reluctant to set aside sale orders where no inequitable con-
duct has occurred.  Cf. Taylor v. Lake (In re Cada Invs., Inc.), 664 F.2d 1158, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (recognizing that despite a strong interest in finality of sale orders, “[c]ourts 
have generally appeared willing to set aside confirmed sales that were ‘tinged with fraud, 
error or similar defects which would in equity affect the validity of any private transac-
tion’” (quoting In re Gen. Insecticide Co., 403 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1968))). 
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lusion between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an 
attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders.’”137  The 
scope of this investigation into the purchaser’s conduct encompasses 
the purchaser’s actions throughout the bankruptcy process up through 
the performance of the sale.138  Moreover, a court will look both to the 
conduct of the purchaser and to the purchaser’s relationship with the 
debtor, treating arm’s-length negotiations and a fair and reasonable 
price for the assets involved as indicia of a good faith purchase.139 
Despite the articulation of these good faith standards, the poten-
tial for unfair dealing and abuse within asset sales consummated  
under § 363 increases when courts fail to take a comprehensive look 
at the parties involved and the underlying transaction.  Although an 
inquiry into whether the sale in question was proposed in good faith is 
often cited as a component of the sound business purpose test, such 
inquiries are often vague and negligible at best, and therefore fail to 
protect creditors and investors from exposure to collusive behavior.140 
In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc. serves as an example.  In 
that case, the debtor proposed a sale of its businesses to ADC in order 
to transfer the debtor’s business operations to the purchaser.141  No-
tice of the motion for approval of the purchase agreement did not in-
dicate that Mr. Gwinn, the debtor’s chairman and CEO, was retained 
as a consultant of the purchaser, nor that he would be employed by 
ADC upon the sale’s closing.142  Despite numerous attempts on the 
 
137 In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d at 1198). 
138 See Charles R. Sterbach & Keriann M. Atencio, Why Johnny Can’t Get Paid on His 
General Unsecured Claims:  A Potpourri of Lingering Abuses in Chapter 11 Cases, 14 J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 111, 127 (2005) (noting that a good faith analysis examines the purchaser’s 
conduct during “the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, including its conduct lead-
ing up to and during the sale itself ”). 
139 See In re W.A. Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 837 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Good faith re-
quires the Court to scrutinize the sales to insure that they are arm’s length transactions 
and absolutely fair under the circumstances.”). 
140 See Rose, supra note 3, at 275 (“Whether it is the inconsistent scrutiny afforded 
§ 363 sales or the more aggressive use by debtors, the current standards are not suffi-
cient to shield the bankruptcy system from unfair dealing and abuse.”).  An analysis of 
the purchase and the underlying relationship between the parties involved may fall 
short of an extensive inquiry when bankruptcy judges defer to disingenuous business 
justifications.  See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 
B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (asserting that when there was a reasonable basis to believe 
that the asset sale had been subject to self-dealing by Enron, the bankruptcy judge 
should have engaged in an analysis of the asset allocation rather than simply deferring 
to the debtor’s business judgment). 
141 In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d at 144-45. 
142 Id. at 145-46. 
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part of unsecured creditors and bidders to object to the purchase 
agreement on grounds of bad faith—specifically, that no appraisal of 
the debtor’s assets had been performed, competitive bidding had 
been chilled, and ADC had agreed to pay an inadequate value—the 
bankruptcy court approved the purchase agreement and the district 
court dismissed the opponent’s appeals as moot.143 
Upon appellate review and after the sale had already closed, the 
Third Circuit ruled that the lower courts erred by failing to recognize 
that “the situation was ripe for collusion and interested dealing.”144  
The courts would have had reason to question the debtor’s and pur-
chaser’s good faith if the lower courts had taken account of the CEO’s 
conflict of interest, the timing of the debtor’s petition, and the ab-
sence of any valuation of the assets being sold.145  The Third Circuit 
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the proceeding 
to the bankruptcy court for several determinations, including whether 
any such collusion between ADC and Abbotts would constitute bad 
faith and, if so, whether ADC had paid “value” for the assets it pur-
chased.146  The bankruptcy court would then have to decide whether it 
could equitably undo the sale of the assets to ADC.147  Thus, the cir-
cumstances of Abbotts Dairies demonstrate the need for bankruptcy 
courts to engage in an earnest analysis of good faith prior to the closing 
of the sale.  Without such an investigation, authorizations of sales made 
in bad faith may be consummated to the detriment of creditors and 
other opponents who then must appeal their objections, an expensive 
and legally problematic undertaking with no predictable outcome.148 
For this reason, the Third Circuit clarified that findings of good 
faith are not to be implied in a bankruptcy court’s approval of a sale 
pursuant to § 363, but rather that a bankruptcy court, when authoriz-
ing such sales, is “required to make a finding with respect to the ‘good 
faith’ of the purchaser.”149  Good faith examinations must be per-
 
143 Id. at 146-48. 
144 Id. at 149. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 151. 
147 Id. 
148 Although the Third Circuit discovered bad faith upon appeal, the possibility of 
a remedy for opponents to the sale, who had asserted arguments of bad faith begin-
ning at the bankruptcy level, was speculative at best.  See id. at 151 (“If the court deter-
mines that ADC did not pay ‘value,’ it will then have to determine whether it has the 
power to undo the sale to ADC; implicit in this determination is the question wheth-
er . . . the sale has become moot under Article III.”). 
149 Id. at 149-50. 
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formed at the bankruptcy court level because the bankruptcy court is 
best equipped to inquire into the good faith of a sale,150 and the dis-
trict court is permitted to make such findings only “in certain very li-
mited circumstances.”151 
Such prominent instances of bankruptcy courts failing to address 
whether a sale has been proposed in good faith reflect the significant 
need for more extensive scrutiny of good faith at the bankruptcy lev-
el.152  Without an explicit investigation into the underlying transaction 
and the relationship between the debtor and purchaser, misuse of 
§ 363 sales will become more likely, to the detriment of the estate, 
creditors, and other interested parties.  The good faith requirement 
remains essential to the integrity and spirit of the Bankruptcy Code and 
thus should not be reduced to investigation at the appellate level after 
assets have already been sold and transferred to bad faith purchasers. 
III.  IN RE GULF COAST OIL CORP.:  A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE ANALYSIS OF PREPLAN ASSET SALES 
Financially distressed companies are increasingly looking to § 363 
for a faster, less burdensome, and cheaper resolution to their financial 
ailments.  A procedure once customarily used “to shed failing plants 
or unneeded equipment”153 as a means of augmenting a successful re-
organization plan has been transformed into a one-stop liquidation of 
large, publicly traded companies like GM and Chrysler.  The last dec-
ade has seen “quantum leaps” in the approval of sales under § 363(b) 
in corporate bankruptcy cases of varying sizes as a consequence of fac-
tors including “active participation in bankruptcy cases by hedge 
funds and other non-bank lending entities, and venue selection based 
on a court’s perceived propensity to approve § 363(b) sales.”154 
 
150 See id. (“First, the bankruptcy court, given its greater familiarity with the parties 
and proceedings, represents the forum best able to make such a determination in the 
first instance.”). 
151 Id. at 150.  The Third Circuit noted that the purpose of requiring bankruptcy 
courts to engage in this scrutiny of asset sales for good faith paralleled the need to do 
so in examining a debtor’s reorganization plan.  An inquiry into the good faith of the 
debtor and, in the § 363 context, the purchaser, is necessary to ensure that the plan or 
sale will comport with the principles of the Code, including creditor protection.  See id. 
at 150 n.5 (“The purpose of requiring such a finding in each situation, however, is 
quite similar:  it prevents a debtor-in-possession or trustee from effectively abrogating 
the creditor protections of Chapter 11.”). 
152 See Rose, supra note 3, at 272-73 (discussing the need for meaningful scrutiny of 
good faith in the face of an easily manipulated business justification test). 
153 Maynard, supra note 6. 
154 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 418-19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
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However, the advantages of this tactic do not come without con-
troversy.  The prominent cases of abuse, as well as the evolving appli-
cation of § 363 as a tool to carry out complete restructurings, raise 
questions concerning the courts’ inconsistent role and whether these 
developments call for corresponding reform of the applicable legal 
standards governing these sales.  Examining the sound business pur-
pose test and the rather lax good faith requirement, it appears that 
the process under this provision has become too easy to maneuver at 
the expense of the interests at stake in bankruptcy.  The Lionel court, 
and all courts following that decisive opinion, rejected a literal read-
ing of § 363(b) that would provide debtors with boundless opportuni-
ties to sell their assets outside of a reorganization plan.155  In recogni-
tion that the statutory language of the Code and decades of case law 
require some form of constraint to be imposed upon debtors and 
purchasers entering into these sales,156 the standard applied must af-
ford creditors and other parties safeguards that will maintain the un-
derlying principles of corporate reorganization.  Accordingly, the shift 
in the use of § 363 sales must be accompanied by a modification of the 
applicable legal standard of court approvals to rebalance the compet-
ing interests of debtor rehabilitation and maximization of value with 
the fair treatment and protection of creditors and equity holders.  As 
this Part discusses, the framework the court presented in Gulf Coast Oil 
fulfills this need—and does so well within the confines of the Code—
by maintaining judicial discretion and including an analysis of good 
faith as interpreted by courts nationwide. 
A.  A Revised Outlook on Approval of § 363 Sales 
1.  Background 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently 
reassessed the Fifth Circuit’s position on the judicial role in approving 
preplan asset sales.  The court was confronted with the issue of wheth-
er to authorize an asset sale proposed by a debtor (Gulf Coast Oil) 
that encompassed several affiliated companies involved in oil and gas 
 
155 See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983). 
156 See id. (“[A]nalysis of the statute’s history and over seven decades of case law 
convinces us that such a literal reading of section 363(b) would unnecessarily violate 
the congressional scheme for corporate reorganizations.”). 
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exploration and production in southern Texas.157  As of 2005, per an 
agreement the debtors entered into with Laurus Master Fund, Ltd. 
(Laurus), Laurus was the debtors’ sole secured creditor.158  Due to fall-
ing oil and gas prices, inadequate cash flow to support a plan of reor-
ganization, and Laurus’s refusal to accept the reorganization plan, the 
debtors filed a motion to sell all of Gulf Coast Oil’s assets.159 
The court recognized that over an eight-month period, the deb-
tors had received little interest from purchasers other than Laurus, 
and thus, there was “little potential for a meaningful auction.”160  If 
Laurus, as the only viable purchaser, bought all of the debtors’ assets, 
then between $200,000 and $300,000 of unsecured claims would not 
be paid.161  Although the debtors claimed that members of the class of 
creditors that possessed lien rights would be protected under the sale, 
since these encumbrances would be transferred to the proceeds of the 
sale, the court rejected this assertion as meaningless.  After the sale, 
there would be no proceeds to which the liens could attach.162  Conse-
quently, because the debtors would retain no assets upon consumma-
tion of the sale, the case would either have to be dismissed or con-
verted to a Chapter 7 “no-asset case,” rather than move forward as a 
reorganization in Chapter 11.163 
2.  A Modified Approach to Authorization of § 363 Sales 
On the issue of whether to authorize the proposed sale of all of 
the debtors’ assets to its sole secured creditor, the court found it use-
ful to evaluate the boundaries of the sound business purpose test and 
the sub rosa doctrine.164  After examining the legal standards applied 
 
157 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 410.  The companies that filed voluntary peti-
tions for Chapter 11 protection on July 28, 2008, included Gulf Coast Oil Corp., Cen-
tury Resources, Inc., and New Century Energy Corp.  Id. at 410. 
158 Id. at 411. 
159 See id. at 412-13.  The debtors’ reorganization plan was infeasible because their 
assets had so dramatically declined in value that Laurus’s secured claim exceeded the 
value of the assets.  Id.  The debtors sought authorization “to sell all of the property of 
the estate, including all cash, oil and gas properties, fixtures, equipment, inventory, 
and office equipment, free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances.”  Id. at 413. 
160 Id. at 412-13.  More specifically, in the eight months in which the debtors mar-
keted their assets, they failed to receive any firm offers, and the only expressions of in-
terest were inadequate since the prices contemplated were much smaller than the 
claim Laurus held.  Id. at 411-13. 
161 Id. at 412. 
162 Id. at 413. 
163 Id. at 414. 
164 Id. at 415-18. 
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by courts in determining motions to approve § 363 sales, the court 
shed light on recent developments in bankruptcy and expressed con-
cern that “[t]he concept of debtor reorganization and rehabilitation is 
in peril.”165  Although the court identified the advantages of these 
sales, it further recognized that businesses’ growing use of “Chap-
ter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds”166 has had 
a significant impact on the potential for improper use of the Code.167  
Putting aside the growing debate between efficiency and protection of 
parties’ interests, the court explained that the continued expansion of 
§ 363 sales necessitated legal guidelines that would address these new 
developments.168 
In the face of these concerns, the court adopted a framework that 
incorporated the sound business purpose test and followed the flexi-
ble structure of weighing all the facts and circumstances of a case as 
implemented by the Lionel court.169  However, the court modified its 
inquiry to include a determination of “whether safeguards are neces-
sary to protect rights that could be exercised in the context of plan 
confirmation.”170  To guide this analysis, the court enumerated thir-
teen factors “that a court can consider in determining whether to ap-
prove a § 363(b) sale prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan”: 
1. “Is there evidence of a need for speed?” 
2. “What is the business justification?” 
3. “Is the case sufficiently mature to assure due process?” 
4. “Is the proposed [asset purchase agreement] sufficiently straightfor-
ward to facilitate competitive bids or [i]s the purchaser the only po-
tential interested party?” 
5. “Have the assets been aggressively marketed in an active market?” 
6. “Are the fiduciaries that control the debtor truly disinterested?” 
7. “Does the proposed sale include all of a debtor’s assets and does it 
include the ‘crown jewel’?” 
 
165 Id. at 419 (quoting Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 
47 B.C.L. REV. 129, 129 (2005)). 
166 Id. at 419 (quoting Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bank-
ruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002)). 
167 Id. at 419.   
168 See id. at 422 (“It would be very helpful if the Fifth Circuit were to take another 
look at the boundaries of § 363(b) sales to provide more guidance to the bankruptcy 
courts in the circuit.”). 
169 Id. at 423. 
170 Id.  
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8. “What extraordinary protections does the purchaser want?” 
9. “How burdensome would it be to propose the sale as part of confir-
mation of a [C]hapter 11 plan?” 
10. “Who will benefit from the sale?” 
11. “Are Special Adequate Protection Measures Necessary and Possible?” 
12. “Was the hearing a true adversary presentation?  Is the integrity of 
the bankruptcy process protected?” 
13. “Other factors that apply to the case at hand.”
171
 
After weighing these considerations, a court “must determine whether 
safeguards are necessary to protect rights that could be exercised in 
the context of plan confirmation” and, if so, may implement such sa-
feguards accordingly.172  Thus, the inquiry the court adopted focuses 
judicial deliberation on securing both maximization of value for the 
debtor’s estate and minimization of creditors’ exposure to vulnerabili-
ties that the reorganization confirmation process would otherwise 
protect.  For the purpose of demonstrating how, in light of the evolu-
tion of § 363 sales, the test the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas advocated builds upon the Lionel framework, this Com-
ment groups the factors into the following categories:  efficiency and 
the maximization of value, creditor protection and the good faith re-
quirement, and preservation of the integrity of the bankruptcy process. 
a.  Factors Aimed at Efficiency and the Maximization of Value 
The first factor—the “need for speed”—seeks to ascertain whether 
an immediate sale is necessary to prevent the asset from deteriorating in 
value.  This question, like the Lionel court’s assessment of whether “the 
asset is increasing or decreasing in value,”173 is aimed at ensuring the 
maximization of value of the debtor’s estate.  Although “[d]isposition of 
perishable assets is the archetype justification for a § 363(b) sale,” the 
Gulf Coast Oil court advanced the caveat that judges must take a dee-
per look into the need to act quickly in the name of value preservation 
because not all asset sales justify immediate action.174  Accordingly, 
 
171 Id. at 422-27. 
172 Id. at 423. 
173 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
174 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423.  Certain fact patterns justify court approval 
of sale proposals outside of confirmation plans.  The Gulf Coast Oil court provided one 
such example in which the sale of an offshore oil-and-gas-production company’s assets 
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courts should be more hesitant to approve § 363 sales since efficiency 
should trump the Chapter 11 safeguards only when a decline in the 
asset’s value threatens a company’s ability to emerge from bankruptcy 
successfully.  For instance, the Second Circuit in In re Chrysler reasoned 
that Chrysler exemplified this “melting ice cube” archetype because 
“its revenues [were] sinking, its factories [were] dark, and its massive 
debts [were] growing.”175 
The second factor—the business justification—embodies Lionel ’s 
sound business purpose test in that a debtor’s pursuit of the sale of all 
or substantially all of its assets must establish a valid business justifica-
tion for entering into the transaction outside of a reorganization 
plan.176  The ninth factor, which considers how burdensome it would 
be to effectuate the proposed sale as an element of confirmation of a 
Chapter 11 plan, serves as a filter, allowing debtors to use § 363 sales 
only where they will be most efficient.  The court distinguished between 
cases involving mega-companies, in which the cost and scope of the 
provision of disclosure statements and confirmation of a plan would be 
quite sizeable, and smaller businesses that would face much lower reor-
ganization costs.177  In cases where the delay resulting from confirma-
tion of a plan is similar to the delay resulting from court approval of a 
§ 363 sale, “there is no apparent reason why it is more appropriate to 
apply equitable powers aggressively to facilitate a § 363(b) sale than it is 
appropriate to apply equitable powers aggressively to let creditors vote 
on that proposal.”178  Thus, the Gulf Coast Oil court prioritizes safeguards 
provided under Chapter 11 unless the debtor establishes that a § 363 
sale will indeed prove to be the quicker and less costly option.179 
b.  Creditor Protection and the Good Faith Requirement 
The following factors are aimed at reconciling the tension be-
tween the efficiency of § 363 sales and the lack of safeguards, includ-
ing disclosure and confirmation, in the § 363 sale process.  The third 
 
was necessary to prevent a decline in value that was inevitable due to the approaching 
hurricane season.  Id. 
175 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. 
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
176 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423. 
177 See id. at 424-25 (comparing the “burdensome and expensive” process for cases 
such as Enron and Lehman Brothers to other “smaller and simpler” cases). 
178 Id. at 425. 
179 Id. at 426 (“The party proposing a § 363(b) sale . . . should be prepared to 
prove, not merely recite, that a § 363(b) sale is quicker and less expensive.”). 
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factor incorporates a creditor-protection requirement into the court’s 
analysis by framing the issue not only in terms of “the amount of 
elapsed time since the filing,”180 but also as a means of detecting 
whether adequate notice has been provided to all interested parties.181  
As previously discussed, under § 363, creditors and investors lose leve-
rage in negotiating the terms of in-plan liquidations as debtors cir-
cumvent the disclosure statements required in the reorganization 
process.182  As a matter of due process, the Gulf Coast Oil court found it 
critical to provide these parties with enough time to receive notice, 
organize their claims and, if desired, participate in defending their in-
terests in the face of these proposals.183  For this reason, judges are en-
couraged to confirm that all parties, not just those who benefit from 
the purchase of the assets,184 are informed and have time to under-
stand how the sale, if approved, would affect their rights.  Assurance 
that the parties possessed the time to receive information regarding 
the sale may assuage concerns of unfair dealing by giving parties the 
opportunity to object to the good faith of the debtor and purchaser 
prior to the closing of the deal. 
The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors directly address the issue of 
good faith in the bankruptcy context, directing the courts to engage 
in an inquiry specifically related to past instances of abuse.  Considera-
tions of whether the proposed purchase agreement facilitates compet-
ing bids or whether the assets in question have been actively mar-
keted185 indicate whether these sales are arm’s-length transactions.  
According to the court’s reasoning, the existence of only one interest-
ed purchaser may be a sign of collusion or insider dealing.186  In not-
ing that “the proponents of § 363 sales argue that competitive markets 
 
180 In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071. 
181 See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423 (noting that “when assets are sold imme-
diately after the case is filed,” the court may worry whether “all parties in interest have 
adequately organized” and “received adequate notice”). 
182 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing differences and advan-
tages gained by circumventing disclosure and equity requirements for reorganization 
plans). 
183 See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423 (“It takes time for . . . creditors and equi-
ty interests to organize and to engage counsel, . . . to hire financial or other ex-
perts . . . , for government regulatory agencies to mobilize . . . and for other creditors 
and parties in interest to determine whether (and how) to participate in the case.”). 
184 See id. at 423-24 (“Proposals for quick sales, understood only by a few parties 
who would benefit from the sale, are inherently suspect.”). 
185 See id. at 424 (“The principal justification for § 363(b) sales is that aggressive 
marketing in an active market assures that the estate will receive maximum benefit.”). 
186 See id. (“The absence of any market is problematic.”). 
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are the assurance of bona fide sales for highest value,” the court deter-
mined that an analysis of the structure of the proposal in terms of 
bidding is a significant step toward obtaining maximum value for the 
estate.187  In addition, the sixth factor pointedly responds to and seeks 
to avoid examples of insider transactions and sweetheart deals exem-
plified in Abbotts Dairies.188  Through acknowledgement of manage-
ment’s fiduciary duties, both as managers of a business and as debtors-
in-possession, the court explicitly integrated the disinterest of these 
parties as an aspect to consider when assessing a debtor’s business 
judgment.189  The connection between the debtor and the purchaser is 
a significant consideration in protecting both the debtor’s estate and 
creditors from being taken advantage of by inadequate purchase prices. 
Moreover, the eighth factor questions the extent to which pur-
chasers of assets may benefit from protections against successor liabili-
ty under Chapter 11.  Although “[t]he Bankruptcy Code seems to 
treat negotiation and acceptance . . . of a chapter 11 plan as the quid 
pro quo for extraordinary bankruptcy benefits,” the court made it clear 
that purchasers do not necessarily have the same rights outside of 
plans that enfranchised creditors confirm.190  Again, the court was see-
mingly concerned with protecting creditors who do not possess the op-
portunity to play a significant role in negotiations or voting on plans. 
The tenth factor evaluates which parties will benefit from a § 363 
sale and ingrains the principle that “bankruptcy is, at its essence, a col-
lective remedy intended to benefit all creditors, not just the secured 
lender.”191  The equal treatment of creditors should not be distorted 
by permitting one or a few select parties to profit from the purchase of 
the debtor’s assets to the detriment of other parties.  Furthermore, 
judicial investigation into the entities that will benefit from these sales 
will deter purchasers who behave in bad faith.  The eleventh factor 
gives judges the power to act in their discretion by adopting protective 
measures where necessary and supplements those safeguards available 
through the reorganization process.192 
 
187 Id.  
188 See text accompanying supra notes 141-48 (outlining the problematic deal 
present in Abbotts Dairies). 
189 See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424 (“If entities that control the debtor will 
benefit, or will potentially benefit, from the sale the court must carefully consider 
whether it is also appropriate to defer to their business judgment.”). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 426. 
192 See id. at 427 (allowing the bankruptcy court to “consider fashioning appropri-
ate” remedies).  
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c.  Preservation of the Integrity of the Bankruptcy Process 
Several factors the Gulf Coast Oil court considered are arguably in-
tended to ensure that distressed companies and other interested par-
ties do not manipulate the Code in ways that Congress did not antic-
ipate.  The seventh factor, which questions whether an asset sale will 
include all of a company’s assets or its most valuable assets,193 seeks to 
further the original purpose of § 363—to liquidate assets like equip-
ment to fund a successful reorganization plan.  Although the court 
did not prohibit sales of companies in their entirety or sales of a busi-
ness’s most valuable asset,194 this factor is salient in discouraging sales 
that extend beyond the legitimate scope of corporate reorganizations 
and congressional intent. 
The twelfth factor addresses the “integrity of the bankruptcy 
process” and urges judges to examine the interests at stake more ex-
tensively to avoid authorizing a sale that jeopardizes those interests or 
contravenes the statutory provisions or fundamental goals of bank-
ruptcy law.195  The last factor ultimately grants judges the discretion to 
give different weight to these considerations or to take account of 
other aspects of a case in determining whether to authorize a sale pur-
suant to § 363.196 
3.  Application of the Gulf Coast Oil Framework 
After articulating these factors and expressing the notion that the 
circumstances surrounding each case are “unique,” the Gulf Coast Oil 
court proceeded to apply these considerations to Gulf Coast Oil’s pro-
posal.197  The court denied the debtor’s motion to sell all of its assets to 
Laurus on the grounds that the debtors had failed to demonstrate a 
good business reason for the need to sell the company prior to a plan 
 
193 See id. at 424 (“Does the proposed sale include all of a debtor’s assets and does 
it include the ‘crown jewel’?”). 
194 See id. (noting that neither kind of sale is “per se prohibited”). 
195 See id. at 427 (describing the judge’s interest in the result of the hearing as striv-
ing to “satisfy public expectations concerning the competence of ‘judicial supervision’ 
of the reorganization process”). 
196 See id. at 427-28 (“There may be other factors that tip the balance or that over-
weigh the evaluative factors set forth above.”).  Notably, this factor indicates that this 
list of considerations is not exhaustive, similar to the list of relevant factors enumerated 
in Lionel.  See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (listing factors that courts may consider but cautioning 
that “[t]his list is not intended to be exclusive”). 
197 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 427-28. 
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confirmation.198  Considering the “the need for speed” and the question 
of “who will benefit from the sale,” the debtor’s proposal lacked evi-
dence of deterioration of the affiliates’ assets or justification for using 
§ 363 to pursue the sale of the debtor’s business to its single secured 
lender.199  Thus, no basis for approving a sale outside of a plan existed 
where the same benefits of using § 363 as a vehicle to preserve the 
going concern value of Gulf Coast Oil’s operations could be reached 
under § 1123 in compliance with the conditions of confirmation.200 
In essence, the court’s rationale in denying the debtors’ motion 
reflected its prior recognition that the procedural burdens of propos-
ing the sale as part of a reorganization plan do not exist in all cases.201  
As here, where § 363 provided no advantage, courts should hesitate to 
allow debtors to sidestep creditor safeguards such as negotiation and 
voting—procedural protections that are clearly important in promot-
ing the equal treatment of creditors under the Code.  Moreover, in 
light of its concern over whether the sale of all of a debtor’s  
assets outside of a confirmation plan falls within the scope of Chapter 
11, the court was cautious in authorizing a sale of all of Gulf Coast 
Oil’s assets, especially where “there is not an active market that assures 
a fair price.”202  In effect, the conclusion not to authorize the sale of 
Gulf Coast Oil prior to a reorganization plan serves as a word of cau-
tion to all bankruptcy courts.  Weighing these factors should encour-
age judges to examine the underlying transaction more extensively, 
above and beyond the proffered business justification, as a means of 
upholding the integrity of and purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code. 
B.  Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite 
The evolving nature of § 363 deals and recent criticism of these 
preplan sales, which are perhaps more appropriately referred to as 
“sale restructurings,” call for a revision of the legal standard applied to 
 
198 Id. at 427-28. 
199 Id. at 426-28.  The Gulf Coast Oil court found the debtors’ argument that use of 
§ 363(b) or § 1123 would not affect the outcome of the disposition irrelevant and in-
sufficient as a business justification.  Id. at 428.  The legal standard does not ask whether 
“an expedited plan process would . . . achieve the same result,” but rather whether a 
business justification exists for permitting court approval of an asset sale outside of the 
disclosure and confirmation requirements called for under Congress’s scheme of  
reorganization.  Id. at 428. 
200 Id. 
201 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (describing the court’s observa-
tion that promotion of a § 363 sale is not desirable or efficient in all cases). 
202 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 428. 
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these cases.  Many bankruptcy petitions, especially those involving 
plans filed by smaller businesses, do not invoke the potential for abuse 
and unfair dealing that has alarmed critics, but the key weaknesses of 
the current framework can be ameliorated by closer judicial scruti-
ny.203  Although the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Tex-
as did not engage in a complete overhaul of the Lionel standard and 
the sub rosa doctrine (courts must still consider factors like “the need 
for speed” and the value of the assets to be purchased), it did inte-
grate several new factors into the analysis in order to direct judicial at-
tention to the evident changes in the use of § 363 that have developed 
since the Second Circuit set forth its seminal decision in 1983.  The 
Gulf Coast Oil court recognized the need to set limitations on the use 
of § 363 in an effort to ensure that financially distressed companies 
and judges do not stray too far from congressional intent.  The com-
prehensive set of guidelines presented in Gulf Coast Oil accomplishes 
this closer scrutiny without altering the essence of the sound business 
purpose test, namely a broad authorization of judicial discretion to 
balance the competing interests that serve as the foundation for mod-
ern bankruptcy law.  Furthermore, the main focus of the additional 
factors set forth by the court fall neatly within the margins of the Code 
and related case law.  Most importantly, by incorporating a good faith 
requirement, this inquiry will be more effective in distinguishing per-
missible § 363 sales from those that open the bankruptcy process to 
potential abuse under the Lionel sound business purpose test. 
The standard prescribed in Gulf Coast Oil maintains the basic ba-
lancing test structure employed under Lionel ’s sound business pur-
pose test, which was designed to confer on judges the flexibility to ad-
dress the tension between efficiency and creditor protection in a 
variety of circumstances.  The interplay of the advantages and draw-
backs of exercising either alternative, whether it is a sale under § 363 
or § 1123, is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.  
As previously discussed, the statutory language, legislative history, and 
policy underlying § 363 create the need for courts to find a balance 
between appropriate standards and giving judges free rein over what 
sales shall be authorized.204  Liberal standards and case-by-case assess-
ments are common throughout a wide range of bankruptcy issues be-
 
203 Critics like Rose support the contention that “expanded good faith and a more 
involved business justification test would safeguard § 363 sales from abuse.”  Rose, su-
pra note 3, at 283. 
204 See supra subsection I.A.1 (explaining the discretion Congress granted to judges 
to authorize or deny asset sales). 
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cause it is generally accepted that drawing “bright-line rules [will] 
constrain the equitable powers of bankruptcy judges to serve the best 
interests of the parties in any given proceeding.”205 
The court in Gulf Coast Oil acknowledged this need to maintain a 
balancing test by requiring bankruptcy judges to “weigh all of the facts 
and circumstances of the case.”206  Thus, this newly developed frame-
work is no more narrow than the test established in Lionel.207  By pro-
viding a list of non-exhaustive factors as a means of updating consid-
erations in light of current trends, critics may argue that application 
of the Gulf Coast Oil framework will result in the same “inconsistent 
treatment by the courts.”208  However, such a criticism distorts Con-
gress’s intent to provide judges with the power to effectuate the goals 
of bankruptcy in a meaningful way.  For instance, strict rules govern-
ing which assets may be sold and an enumeration of an exclusive set 
of business reasons that will justify these sales will result in the hin-
drance of some debtors from maximizing the value of their estates in 
contravention of the purpose of § 363.  Furthermore, an examination 
of the court’s analysis reveals that judicial discretion in these cases 
may in fact serve as a powerful mechanism to counteract recent con-
cerns.  The Gulf Coast Oil framework confers upon judges the authority 
to fashion safeguards similar to those required by in-plan sales,209 de-
monstrating that discretion may be just the tool necessary to protect 
the interests at stake. 210  As bright-line rules are generally not appro-
priate in the bankruptcy context, the model used by the Bankruptcy 
Court of the Southern District of Texas provides the best option for 
encouraging judges to exercise their discretionary power more effec-
tively.  This new model will encourage bankruptcy judges to address 
new considerations and inquire into the good faith of the sale as a 
 
205 Jackson, supra note 2, at 454, 497-98. 
206 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423. 
207 See Eric English, Texas Bankruptcy Court Rejects Chapter 11 Debtors’ Request to Sell 
All of Their Assets and Calls for Fifth Circuit to Clarify Legal Standard, LEXISNEXIS EMERG-
ING ISSUES ANALYSIS, May 14, 2009, available at LEXIS, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3629 
(“[T]he opinion in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp. demonstrates that some courts construe 
section 363 and the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent rather narrowly.”). 
208 Rose, supra note 3, at 250. 
209 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423. 
210 See, e.g., In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 824-26 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2009) (utilizing the discretion afforded by the Gulf Coast Oil test to approve a proposed 
asset sale on the condition that certain terms of the agreement, such as the release of 
three key employees and a general unsecured creditors trust, were removed in order to 
avoid evasion of the Chapter 11 confirmation process).  
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means of shaping § 363 sales into transactions that balance debtor re-
habilitation with creditor protection. 
In conjunction with this affirmation of discretion, the Gulf Coast 
Oil standard encourages more stringent scrutiny of § 363 sales from 
yet another angle often overlooked by courts.  In recent years, much 
attention has been drawn to cases such as Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. 
Enron Corp. and In re Abbotts Dairies, in which bankruptcy courts have 
failed to take notice of potential insider dealing—conduct clearly  
exemplifying bad faith under the relevant good faith paradigm.211   
Despite the recognition that both § 363(m) and § 1112(b) impose a 
good faith obligation on both the debtor and purchaser, it is common 
for opinions involving approval of § 363 sales merely cite good faith as 
a component of the sound business purpose test without delving into 
any such inquiry.  Critics often warn that because of 
vague “you know it when you see it” standards for good faith . . . and the 
ability of the dominant parties to create a business justification for a 
quick sale, the bankruptcy courts are being turned into the auction 
houses of choice for businesses with either financial trouble or the po-
tential of liabilities that would otherwise follow their assets.
212
 
For this reason, § 363 sales have become vehicles for abuse and, as such, 
courts must undertake a more stringent analysis of good faith before 
approving these transactions in order to comply fully with the Code. 
The framework set out in Gulf Coast Oil resolves this issue by  
implying a good faith requirement within its enumerated factors.   
Although the case does not expressly use the term “good faith,” sever-
al factors of the test aim to detect bad faith as it has been interpreted 
within the context of § 363 sales.  First, the consideration of the disin-
terest of the fiduciaries controlling the debtor serves to discern 
whether a transaction is tainted by inside dealing and collusion.213  
Requiring the establishment of a good business reason for selling a 
debtor’s assets outside of a plan of reorganization was designed to 
provide a limitation on the use of § 363 sales, a constraint believed to 
be necessary to further the purpose of the bankruptcy process.214  
 
211 See discussion supra Section I.B (highlighting the self-dealing present where 
bankruptcy courts do not adequately investigate asset sales). 
212 George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining 
the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 272-73 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
213 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424. 
214 See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Every sale under § 363(b) does not automatically short-
circuit or side-step Chapter 11; nor are these two statutory provisions to be read as mu-
tually exclusive.”). 
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However, deference to a business judgment provided by interested 
members of management who seek to gain money, stock, or employ-
ment with the purchaser would render this limitation meaningless.  
For instance, had the bankruptcy court in In re Abbotts Dairies investi-
gated the question of whether Mr. Gwinn, the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of the debtor, was truly a disinterested fiduciary, the 
court would have had reason to doubt the proffered business reason 
for the sale of the assets to ADC.215  Surely Mr. Gwinn’s expected em-
ployment with the debtor’s prospective purchaser would have given 
the court a strong foundation to believe that collusion had occurred 
between the fiduciary and ADC and that the agreement reached be-
tween the parties did not maximize the debtor’s value.  Thus the court 
intended this consideration to augment the vigor of the sound busi-
ness purpose test. 
Moreover, the questions related to the beneficiaries of the sale—
whether there has been an active market for the assets involved and if 
the terms of the purchase agreement facilitate competitive bids—
attempt to discern whether the transaction has been negotiated at 
arm’s length.216  A dissection of the court’s reasoning for characteriz-
ing these factors as significant indicates that an inquiry into the mar-
ket and the potential purchaser is necessary in order to ensure both 
that the estate receives the maximum value for the assets and that a 
low purchase amount that benefits only the purchaser does not harm 
creditor’s rights or the debtor’s rehabilitation.217 
These factors provide courts with the guidelines necessary to ad-
dress recent concerns head-on because the factors incorporate direct 
considerations of good faith, rather than implying that the superficial 
citations of the term satisfy the requirement.  Some courts do under-
take inquiries into the good faith of the debtor and purchaser,218 and 
in these cases, one can argue that the Gulf Coast Oil considerations 
reach the same outcome expressly that other courts arrive at implicit-
 
215 Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. (In re Abbotts Dairies 
of Pa., Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1986). 
216 In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424-26. 
217 See id. at 424 (“[A]ggressive marketing in an active market assures that the es-
tate will receive maximum benefit.”). 
218 See e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 106-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (con-
cluding that negotiations between Fiat and Chrysler were in good faith, that neither 
the terms of the agreement nor the involvement of the government precluded compet-
itive bidding, and that the government did not constitute an “insider” of the debtors), 
aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension 
Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 
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ly.  However, as shown, all too often bad faith proposals are caught on-
ly at the appellate level.219  Consequently, there is a concern that un-
less a party objects to a sale with enough fervor, bad faith transactions 
that are not in the best interests of the parties and have the ability to 
tarnish the integrity of the bankruptcy process will slip through the 
growing loopholes of the sound business purpose test.  Where appeals 
are often difficult to come by220 and such great interests are at stake, 
the standard set forth in Gulf Coast Oil reaches the appropriate solution 
to the current tendency of judges to bypass a good faith analysis and 
creditor safeguards in favor of the debtor’s business judgment. 
Furthermore, even in cases where the court investigates the good 
faith of the purchaser, courts disregard the more general interpreta-
tion of good faith, that is, whether a debtor seeks to achieve a purpose 
“outside the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.”221  Although the 
Lionel factors partially address this issue by contemplating the like-
lihood of the proposal or confirmation of a reorganization plan and 
the effect of the sale on any future plans,222 case law indicates that 
good faith extends beyond possession of a “valid reorganizational 
purpose.”223  Notably, the court in Gulf Coast Oil addressed the latest 
concerns stimulated by the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies:  questions 
of good faith in the broader context of Chapter 11 and whether courts 
are authorizing sales that go beyond the purpose of § 363.  Factors in-
cluding whether “the proposed sale include[s] all of a debtor’s assets” 
and if the proposal is adverse to the integrity of the bankruptcy 
process224 have the purpose of uncovering whether this use of § 363 as 
a substitute for corporate restructurings is legitimately within the 
scope of bankruptcy law.  Although the outcome of the Chrysler bank-
ruptcy may not have been altered by an analysis of these factors, a fur-
ther investigation into the legislative history and purpose behind 
§ 363 may have provided debtors, creditors, investors, judges, and law-
yers insight into the boundaries of this expanding tactic.  In light of 
the relationship between the controversial aspects of § 363 sales and 
 
219 See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s 
review of Abbotts Dairies). 
220 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (describing the practical barriers 
to appeal in such instances). 
221 Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994). 
222 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
223 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting the factors set forth by the 
Sixth Circuit for aiding courts “in determining that the debtor has filed in bad faith”). 
224 In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 424-72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
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the factors set forth by the Gulf Coast Oil court, it is evident that this 
more comprehensive standard gives the sound business purpose test 
the bite necessary to encourage judges to take a more critical stance in 
authorizing these transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
While the advantages of a quick, less costly, and often more effi-
cient sale of assets within the scope of a bankruptcy petition are mani-
festly undisputed, the generally accepted sound business purpose test 
has grown too malleable in the hands of powerful creditors and self-
interested debtors.  The need for a more stringent legal standard to 
assist courts in determining whether to authorize a sale under § 363 
has surfaced with new urgency in this turbulent economy.  The 
framework the Gulf Coast Oil court adopted provides an updated and 
balanced solution to the concerns arising from the expanded use of 
§ 363 as a complete restructuring tactic by emphasizing both the ben-
efits of this provision and the constraints that should be applied to 
bad faith debtors and purchasers. 
The thirteen enumerated factors offer a basis on which judges 
may exercise their statutory “unfettered” discretion to mold these sales 
in the most efficient, yet creditor-friendly manner.  Additionally, the 
factors’ analysis of good faith from several perspectives—namely an 
investigation into the underlying relationship between the debtor and 
the purchaser, as well as a discussion of whether the transaction falls 
within the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws—promotes prin-
ciples significant throughout other aspects of the bankruptcy process.  
This foundation preserves the advantages of § 363 but at the same time 
recognizes the need to weigh the competing interests of debtor rehabil-
itation and creditor protection inherent in bankruptcy law.  As a result, 
Gulf Coast Oil ’s flexible, yet more focused approach allows courts to ad-
dress concerns of abuse while tailoring § 363 sales to promote the un-
derlying goals of bankruptcy.  Therefore, as § 363 sales continue to 
evolve, this standard should serve as the model for future courts. 
 
